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Unconventional Confederates
Union troops neutralized guerrillas and rangers
The Uncivil War offers a systematic evaluation of the role that irregular
operations played in Confederate strategy in the Upper South and the
effectiveness of Union responses to these operations. Mackey, a United States
Army officer, divides Confederate unconventional operations into three types:
guerrilla warfare, or intermittent operations by self-constituted units; partisan
operations, or the use of elite conventional units in unconventional roles; and
raiding by conventional cavalry. He also groups Union responses into three
categories: antiguerrilla operations designed to eliminate irregular combatants;
passive counterguerrilla measures such as railroad blockhouses; and
counterinsurgency operations intended to deny civilian support to
unconventional forces. Mackey then uses detailed case studies to consider each
type of Confederate irregular warfare: the activities of Confederate guerrillas in
Arkansas, the career of Colonel John Singleton Mosby's 43rd Virginia Cavalry,
and the raids conducted by Brigadier Generals John Hunt Morgan and Nathan
Bedford Forrest in Kentucky and Tennessee. Mackey argues that the
Confederate government made extensive use of unconventional operations, but
that Union forces defeated or neutralized every attempt. When the Confederate
armies surrendered, therefore, Southern officers did not resort to irregular
operations precisely because these methods had already failed.
Mackey centers his discussion of the war in Arkansas on the policies of Maj.
Gen. Thomas C. Hindman. Newly appointed to Arkansas following the
Confederate defeat at the Battle of Pea Ridge, Hindman was desperate to delay
the expected Union invasion while he rebuilt his conventional forces. In June
1862, Hindman issued General Orders 17 and 18, which authorized citizens to
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form companies of ten men under an elected captain and placed these companies
under the authority of the nearest provost marshal. Eventually, over 5,000 men
joined these companies, and for a time they met Hindman's purposes. When
Union forces attempted to open the White and Little Red Rivers and then move
on Little Rock in 1862, Confederate guerrillas swarmed the waterways, sniping
at Union craft and harassing Federal landing parties. Union forces found the
guerrillas such a menace that they quickly resorted to punitive operations such as
executing captured guerrillas and burning homes, farms, and towns in areas
where the irregular forces operated.
But Confederate authorities soon lost control of the irregular companies.
Increasingly, the guerrillas shifted from harassing Federal forces to terrorizing
Unionists and living off the population. In the spring of 1863, Confederate
authorities ordered the guerrillas to enroll in regular units and sent troops to
break up the irregular companies. Union forces also employed increasingly
effective measures against the guerrillas. In the most threatened areas they
required families either to leave or to relocate to fortified farm colonies protected
by Home Guard units. Union officers also formed a special riverine unit of
gunboats, transports, and land forces to patrol the waterways and respond rapidly
to guerrilla threats, though poor discipline and command conflicts kept this unit,
the Mississippi Marine Brigade, from having the effect intended. Finally, the
Union command recruited Arkansas Unionists into special antiguerrilla units,
which had considerable success in hunting down Confederate irregulars.
Mackey draws a sharp contrast between the Arkansas guerrillas and Mosby's
Partisan Rangers. Though they were dispersed among the population, operated in
small bands, and sometimes wore civilian clothes or Federal uniforms, Mosby's
men were officially enrolled Confederate soldiers. They were subject to military
discipline, rarely took private property, and operated against military targets
under the command of commissioned officers. By repeatedly sabotaging the
critical Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capturing wagon trains, eliminating Union
pickets and garrisons, and collecting critical intelligence, Mosby's men
effectively hampered Union operations in northwest Virginia, cost the Union
considerably in materiel and manpower, and provided a huge boost to
Confederate morale. Mackey attributes the unit's success to a few critical factors:
Mosby's freedom to recruit selectively from among the Virginia cavalry units,
his authority to distribute captured Federal property, the support the unit received
from Gen. Robert E. Lee and the Confederate War Department, Mosby's own
operational inventiveness, and his practice of operating in small units of ten to 20
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men.
Union forces took a number of steps to counter Mosby's operations,
including the construction of an extensive network of blockhouses and stockades
along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the employment of armored trains,
expanded operations against partisan forces, and the recruitment of special
antipartisan units such as Captain Richard Blazer's Independent Scouts. Though
these measures certainly reduced the amount of damage the partisans inflicted,
Mackey argues that Union efforts were hampered by a fundamental
misunderstanding. Drawing on their experiences in West Virginia, Union
officers such as Brig. Gen. David Hunter and Col. George Crook viewed
Mosby's men as rag-tag guerrillas, rather than the disciplined, effectively led
troops they actually were, and repeatedly underestimated their abilities. When
Union antiguerrilla operations failed, Northern troops increasingly resorted to
punitive measures against the population, culminating in the Union campaign of
destruction against the Shenandoah Valley in 1864.
Mackey asserts that the long tradition of cavalry raiding and its chivalrous
overtones made this form of irregular warfare particularly appealing to
Confederate authorities. Recognizing the superiority of Confederate cavalry at
this time, and the fragility of Union communications, in the summer of 1862
Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg sent cavalry into the Union rear to tear up railroad
track, eliminate Federal posts and garrisons, and destroy supply depots. Mackey
argues that these raids effectively halted Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell's advance
toward Chattanooga, opened the way for the Confederate invasion of Kentucky,
and again boosted Southern morale. But they also gave the Confederates a false
sense of what raiding could accomplish and led Morgan to attempt the same
approach in 1863, with unfortunate results.
Union commanders, conversely, used the winter of 1862-63 to revamp their
responses to Confederate raiding. They strengthened the network of blockhouses
and stockades on the railroads, improved the training of troops in the rear, and
instituted harsh penalties for commanders who surrendered garrisons. They also
greatly improved Union cavalry and increased the number of gunboats patrolling
the rivers. Thus, when Morgan launched his raid into Kentucky in 1863 he faced
determined resistance from Union garrisons, bombardment by gunboats, ruthless
pursuit by Union cavalry, and harassment by thousands of Home Guardsmen in
Ohio and Indiana. Together these measures delayed and wore down Morgan's
men and eventually led to their defeat and capture. This, along with Forrest's
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promotion to command the left wing of Bragg's cavalry in the summer of 1863,
ended large-scale raiding in the western theater.
The Uncivil War is an ambitious work that brings together previously
scattered information and offers a series of bold propositions. Mackey sets
Confederate irregular operations within a clear strategic framework, presents a
precise analysis of their successes and failures, and offers a particularly
insightful evaluation of Union responses to the Confederate unconventional war.
His work deserves praise for cutting through the melodrama that too often has
surrounded this topic and for offering a critical, unsentimental evaluation of the
Confederate irregular war in the Upper South.
The Uncivil War also suffers from a few curious flaws. Mackey seems
determined to cast his analysis within a framework of military doctrine, even
though that concept would have had limited meaning to most Civil War officers.
This determination leads him to base his approach on the writings of Carl von
Clausewitz and Henri Jomini, even while offering no substantial evidence that
the main figures in his work drew on these concepts in any way, and even
occasionally to employ 20th century concepts. More serious is Mackey's
insistence on viewing the unconventional war almost entirely from a centralized,
military perspective and deliberately dismissing any other approach. Reflecting
the attitude of too many Civil War officers, Mackey tends to deride guerrillas as
bandits or thugs. Many guerrillas were criminals, and certainly they could not
compare with partisans or regular troops in military effectiveness. But this view
ignores the important political roles of guerrillas and their abilities to control the
loyalties of a region, suppress dissent, and frustrate occupation policies. It also
ignores the fact that the South did indeed resort to guerrilla warfare, in the form
of the Ku Klux Klan and similar secret organizations, to frustrate Union racial
and reconstruction policies during Reconstruction. Considering the use of
Mackey's work at the United States Army's Command and General Staff College
and Advanced Military Studies program, this is a critical issue, for any analysis
of irregular warfare that leaves out its political, social, and even cultural
elements will inevitably prove inadequate and perhaps even misleading.
Dr. Noel Fisher is the author of War at Every Door: Partisan Politics and
Guerrilla Violence in East Tennessee, 1860-1869 and of a forthcoming work on
the Civil War in the Great Smoky Mountains region.
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